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COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
LAW AND ENFORCEMENT:
RUSSIA
Russia belongs to the continental European
civil law tradition although its long history of autocracy and Soviet totalitarianism has left a dislinn imprint on it.'i system of criminal justice.
Three great historical watersheds have left their
imprint on Russian law: {I) the legal reforms of
Tsar Alexander II in 1864; (2) the Bolshevik Revohuinn in l!H 7; and (:i) the collapse of the Soviel
Union in 1991 and the ensuing period oflegal
reform aimed at moving to a capitalist market
economy, pluralist democracy, and a state under
the ruk of law and eliminating t.he worsl abuses
of the Soviet criminal justice system.
The modern reform movement commenced
during pet·estroilw, the attempt to transform r.he
Soviet l:nion under 1lu: leadership of Mikhail
C.orbachev (1985-1991). Its goals received their
clearest expression in a document entitled the
"('..oncept for judicial Reform," which was approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Federation on 21 October 1991 and which
looked to the 1864 reforms for inspiration. The
most important of these goals were: ( l) creating
an independent judiciary by reducing its dependence on local officials and making it self-
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governing; (2) introducing adversary procedure
and trial by jury; (3) stripping the office of the
public prosecutor or procuracy (p1·oku.mtura) of
it.s oversight over the courts and ils quasi~judicial
powers to order invasions of constitutionally protected rights of the citizens; and (4) strengthening the right to counsel and the right.s of
defendants to protect against abusive practices
by law cnlim:cmcnt organ$.
Significant reform legislation was passed by
the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in
1992 and 1993 during the presidency of Boris
Yehsin. This consisted of amendments to the
1978 Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and, most notably, the Law on the Status of Judges, passed on
26 June 1992, and a law introducing trial by jury,
passed on 16 July 1993 (Jury Law). After Yehsin's violent dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in
October of 1993 and the passage by referendum
or the Constitution ol'thc Russian Federation on
12 December 1993, strengthening presidential
powers at the expense of a weakened bicamer"!\"1
legislature, the pace of reform slowed but the
new lower house, the State Duma, continued to
pass signili(:ant legislation, most notably, the Law
on Operational Investigative Activities, passed on
12 August 1995, the Criminal Code of t11e Russian Feder.uion, signed into law on 13 June
1996, and the Federal Constitutional Law on the
Judicial System of the Russian Federation,
signed on 31 December 1996. The long-awaited
new draft Code of Criminal Procedure, which
was presented to the Duma on 3 july 1995 {1995
Draft CCP), and passed first reading, has, as of
early 2000, still not made it out of the lower
house, leaving the heavily amended 1960 Code
of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR (CCP) in
force.
Another important impulse for criminal just ke rdimn in Russia, as in ollu:r post-sodalist

states of Europe, has been its petition for, and
subsequent admission into, the Council of Europe, a condition of which was the signing of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which
took place on 28 February 1996. Ankle 15{4) of
the Constitution gives this treaty, and the other
most important human rights treaty, the United
Nations International Covcnam on Civil and rolitical Rights, which the Soviet Union signed in
1976, priority over domestic law and makes them
directly applicable by rhe courts.
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Criminal procedure
The principle of adversary procedure has
been constimtionally rooted since 1992 and was
mdilicd in I he 1993 Jury Law. Although the m~w
jury system has been preliminarily limited to just
nine of Russia's eighty-nine political subdivisions, the new provisions have begun to be applied in nonjury cas<:s. 'lltr<-T of the prime
aspects of the turn to adversary procedure that
were at the heart of the reform movement were:
(1) reducing the role of the procuracy to that of
prosecuwr nf criminal <:aS<~s wil h powers c<tualw
that of the defense; (2) transforming the judge
from an inquisiwr, duty-bound to determine the
truth and empowered to perform quasiproscnnoriallunctions, inlo an imJklrtial arbiter,
who guarantees the equal rights of the parties
during the trial; and (3) strengthening defense
rights, including the right to counsel.

The criminal investigation
·n1e criminal investigation in serious cases is
divided into two stages: an informal inquest (doznanie), performed by the police (militsiia), and a
f(>rmal preliminary invest.igalion (Jnedvaritel'noe
sledstvtia). usually conducted by a legally trained
investigator (sledm!(ltel} who works for the Ministry of Internal Affairs but is subordinate l.o the
procuracy. Less serious cases are investigated by
the police and their reports are submitted in
writing directly to the courts, bypassing the formal preliminary investigation. The investigator's
role is similar to that of investigating magistrates
in France or Spain, who are, however, part ofthe
judiciary. The modern European trend, however, is to entrust the public prosecutor with the
formal criminal investigation, this change having
been made in Germany in 1974 and Italy in
1988.
The activity oft he police during the int1uesl
is supposed t.o be limited to arresting suspects, securing the crime scene, and taking initial statements from available suspects and witnesses. The
police should inli>rm I he prot:uraq wi1hin twenty-four hours of the arrest of a suspect and the
case should then be turned over to the investigator who decides whether to initiate a formal criminal investigation. The investigator's actions are
limited by strict rules of evidence-gathering laid
down in the CCP. All investigative acts are meticulously documemed in writing and collected in
an investigative dossier that follows the case into
the courts and serves as a repository for vital evi-

dence during trial and appeal. The procurator
has forty-eight hours after notification to either
issue an order of preventive detention or release
the suspect.
Most suspects against whom a preliminary
investigation is initiated remain in <:ustody in
preventive <kl.enlion lacilitics until trial. Although the maximum time for pretrial detention
is fixed at two months, many extensions are available up to a maximum of eighteen months. Detention is authorized if 1hcre is !Car the
defendant will not appear for trial, will destroy
evidence, commit more crimes, or just because of
the seriousness of the offense. A Special Rapport<:ur lilr the U niH:d Nftions has lbund !hat
Russia's eighteen-month limit on pretrial detention violates Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civihand Political Rights and that the
r.ue of detention is excessive (lrom :10 to r.o percent of persons facing at least one-year imprisonment). The figure in France, for comparison, is
around 10 percent. The population in Russia's
prcvemivc detention cenlrrs rose !rom 23g,(){)(J
in 1994 to about 300,000 in 1999.
~
Article 22(2) of the Constitution states that
deprivation of libeny, induding 1n·cven1ivc detention, is only possible with a 'judicial decision"
and that such decision must be taken within
forty-eight hours of arrest. Unfortunately, the
Russian legislature ha.~ never cnaucd legislation
implementing this constitutional protection. A
halfway measure was enacted on 23 May 1992,
which provided for the first time in modern Russian hiswry a mcd1anism 10 appeal the procurator's decision on preventive detention to the
courts. A detained person's petition for release
must be conveyed to d1e court and procurator
within l.wemy-fi>Ur hours. Bocumenl.~ relevant
for the decision of the case must be transferred
to the court widtin an additional twenty-four
hours (Art. 220.1 CCP). The judge must then decide the issue within three davs of rc<:civing th<:
aforesaid documents (Art. 220.2 CCP). Alth~ugh
judges began granting such motions for release,
officials of the procuracy and the Ministry of the
lmcrior, which l:omrols the police and prisoner
transport, flouted the law and often refused to
produce the prisoner or the papers required to
decide the issue within t.he statutory tiiUe limit.
They would also often re-arrest persons released
by judges before they could leave the courtroom.
On 14 June I 994, President. Yeltsin himself violated the Constitution by issuing an edict. on "immediate measures to defend the population from
banditry and other manifestations of organized
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crime" that allowed detention of suspects for up
to thirty days without charges.
To protect suspc1..1s against being coerced to
confess to crimes, a recurrent problem in Soviet
times, a constitutional ri.ght to counsel from the
moment of arrest or det.ention was introduced
(Ar1. 4H{2) ConsL RF). In addition, Aniclc 51 of
the Constitution guarantees the right not to testify against oneself, and the Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that the police,
procurawr, or invcslig-awr nuJst advise a suspect
of the right to remain silent and of the right ro
counsel before commencing an interrogation.
Counsel will be appointed for the indigem. Un({,rumatdy the poli<:e routinely (;ucnc suspt:cls
into "waiving" their right to counsel. Even where
investigators try to supply a suspect with appointed counsel, lawyers sometimes refuse to
represent indigem defendants because oflhc low
pay for court-appointed lawyers. If suspects refuse to give a statement they are often tortured.
There have been estimates that around 40 pcrc:em or higher nfall suspt:CIS arc tortured. usually through beating, but also by asphyxiation or
electric shock. Police give other inmates in the
pretrial detemion facilities special privileges to
heal, rape, or otherwise l<m:e suspects into omfessing. Just the veiled threat of torture induces
suspects to confess, even sometimes to crimes
they did not commit.
Article 23(2) of the Constitution requires a
judicial decision for any invasions of the right to
privacy in one's writings, telephone conversations, and postal or Ldcgraphic communicaljons,
and Article 24 requires a judicial decision for invasions of the home. Despite this and comparable provisions in the European Convention of
I Iuman Rights, such searches and sdzures may
still be authorized by the procurator alone. To
prevent crimes the 1995 Law on Operational Investigative Activities has also given the police
broader powers than those enumerated in t.hc
CCPto engage in both open and secret investigative activities. The law includes provisions dealing with wiretapping. electronic interception of
omversations, omtrolted deliveries and the usc
of undercover informants but lacks adequate
guidelines for issuance of warrants, or notifying
targets of the measures atler they have been undertaken. Russia's failure to eliminate the pmcurator's power to authorize invasions of
constitutionally protected citizens' rights; a
power recognized as belonging exclusively to a
judge in modern human rights documents, can
be attributed to the proruracy's staunch opposi-
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tion to all reforms aimed at undermining its
power.
Created by Peter the Great in 1722, the pron!Tacy came In be known as thl: "eye of the emperor" due to its exercise of oversight over all judicial and administrative bodies. AJthough the
proruracy was stripped of these "supervisory"
limctions pursuant t.o t.he rcli>rms nf Hlli4, and
restricted for the most part to the prosecution of
criminal cases, the Bolsheviks resurrected the
pre-1864 model of the procuracy in 1922, vesting it again with general powers to supervise the
legality of acts of administrative officials and the
courts. The Soviet procuracy was undoubtedly
the most powerful institution in the administ.ration ofjustice. When citizens complained of a violation of their rights, their remedy, ironically,
was to appeal to the procurator, not a court, at
a time when the procuracy itself was working
closely with the Committee of State Security
(KGB) in investigating, arresting, and prosecuting dissidents. The only success reformers have
had in limiting the institutional power of the
procuracy was the elimination of its oversighti"if
the courts, which was accomplished by the Law
on the Proruracy passed by the Supreme Soviet
on 17 January l992.
When the investigator determines that there
i.s sufficient evidence to hold the accused to answer for trial he prepares an accusatory pleading
;md forwards it to the procurator for review. The
accused and his counsel have, at this point, the
right to full discovery of the entire contents ofthe
investigative dossier. The procurator may dismiss the case, amend the pleading, or lorward
the case to the court for trial.

Fair trial and independent judiciary
Article 120 of the Constitution proclaims that
"judges are independent and are subordinate
nnly tn the Constitution of lh<: Russian Fed<:ration and federal law." Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights also guarantees
the right of every criminal defendant to an independem judge. Prior to lHfi4 1he nmns were
subservient to notoriously corrupt provincial
governors. The 1864 reforms set up the framework for a genuinely independent judiciary with
life tenure and introduced trial by jury to further
liberate judges from the influence of local officialdom. The Bolshevik Decree on the Courts of
i December 19l i, however, put an end to an independent judiciary and the jury court was eventually replaced by a mixed court composed of
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one career judge, elected for a term of five years
by local party officials, and two "people's assessors'' also selected by party-controlled collectives.
Although the Soviet mixed court looked superlicially similar to the German Schiiffengericltt, the
court became dependent on local officials (of the
government and party), much as had the prel!!ti4 courts. The penplc's assessors were nicknamed the "nodders" because they virtually
never outvoted the professional judge. The professional judge, on the other hand, relied on local
officials for being nominated, retained in office,
and for obtaining housing and technical and material support for the court's functioning. In controversial cases "telephone law" prevailed, that
is, local officials would telephone the judge and
indicate the way the case should be resolved.
The 1992 Law.on the Status of .Judges increased the social and leg-al protection of judges
and, as amended, guaranteed their tenure in office until the retirement age of sixty-five, after a
probationary period of three years. As in IS64,
trial by jury was introduced in 1993 as a means
of providing citizen participation in the administration of justice but also to insulate judges from
outside inlluenn;s. The rdi~rms have not yet had
their desired effects. In I 999 Russia had only
14,352 judges, about half the number of judges
as in the :Netherlands and far less than the projened number of 35.742. The Russian govt~rn
ment has also refused to allocat.e sufficient
budgetary resources to the court system to allow
it to function properly. The situalion was espe<ially critical in I99H; when many wu rl s were u nable t.o pay their bills and electricity, telephone
and other services were cut off. Many court.s
stopped hearing criminal and dvil cases and the
andt:nl Russian menan! ofjudicial subserviem:e
to local officialdom resurfaced. As many as half
of aU district trial courts receive money and other
support from regional or local governments or
even privaw businesses, which usually is nmpled
with demands of the sponsoring parlies. Bribery
ofjudges is widespread. To ease the overburdening of the courts, which affects the quality ofjustice rendered, tht: 1~1!)1\ Law on the Jud.idal
System provided for a reinstitution of local justices of t.he peace (mirovye sud'i), a system introduced by the 1864 reforms, as the lowest. level in
the judicial hierarchy. Justices of the Peace
would be competent to handle trials of minor
civil and criminal cases and administrative law violations. The Draft Law on justices of the Peace,
however, was vetoed by President Yeltsin in
March of 1998 for financial reasons.

Most criminal cases are tried in the district
(rayonrt))') courts. Cases punishable by no more

than five years imprisonment are tried by a single
prokssional judge. Most <:asc;; punishable by
from five to fifteen years imprisonment, and all
juvenile cases, are tried by the Soviet-era mixed
court of one professional judge and two "people's as:«:ssnrs." The "'[>t:ople's assessors" are no
longer appointed by Communist-controlled collectives, of course, and it has become increasingly
difficult to get them to attend court because of
the meager pay they receive. The second-level
trial courts (one in each ofthe eighty-nine political subdivisions of t.he country) hear cases of aggravated (capital) murder and selected other
grave felonies. Tbe cases are usually tried by the
mixed court. In the areas in which trial by jury
functions (as of 2000 only iu Moscow, Ivanovo,
Riazan, Saratov. Rostov-on-the-Don, and
Ul'ianovsk regions and Altay, Krasnodar, and
Stavropol territories), the defendant has a choice
of being tried by a jury of twelve, presided over
by one professional judge, by a panel of t.hree
professional judges, or by the mixed court willi
people's assessors. These courts handle appeals
from the district courts as well. A special system
of milit11ry courts exercises jurisdiction over
crimes committed by military personnel.
Under the jury Law,jurors are randomly selected from Russiau citizens at least tweruy-five
years of age who are registered voters in the region in which the crime was commirted. Jurors
are required to serve only once a year for not
more than ten days or for one case. They are
paid one-half of the pro-rata salary of a judge,
substantially higher than lay assessors, and this
has helped guarantee their attendance at. trial.
Russia and Spain ( 1995) havte been the only
countries on the European continem to return to
trial by jury after the institution was virtually
eliminated by the tot.alitarian regimes of the first
half of the twentieth century. Although the new
constitutions of Belarus (Art. 114) and Kazakhstan (Art. 75(2)) provide for trial by jury, no implememing legislation has been passed.
Judgments and decisions of1he sccond-lcvd
courts (whether acting as trial or appellate
courts) may be appealed to the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation. the highest normal
appellate court in civil and criminal matters. Ap·
peals at all levels are heard by three professional
judges without lay participation. The Supreme
Court also hears a select number of cases as a trial
court composed of one judge and two people's
assessors. The Supreme Court consists of 115
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judges, divided into criminal, civil, military and
cassational panels. It has a governing body called
the Presidium, consisting of the president and
l.wclv<~ oth<T judges, whidt has a power of review
over the decisions of the panels.
The Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation, modeled on that of the Federal Republic nf Germany, was created in l!J<Jl, suspended following Yeltsin's attack on parliament
in October of 1993, and reconstituted following
the passage of the 1993 Constitution. It now consists of nineteen judges elected by the Federation
Council, the upper house of the new parliament,
upon nomination by the president: The Constitutional Court can decide the constitutionality of
the application of the criminal law in panicular
cases upon a petition of a citizen or of a lower
court in which the particular rase is pending. On
3 l October 1995. the Supreme Court articulated
a policy that the regular couns had authority to
determine whether laws, or their application in
a partkular <:ase, were consistent with the Constitution and international human right.s conventions. This power was codified in the 1996 Law
on the Judicial System. A criminal defendant
who has exhausted all remedies in the Russian
courts may file a petition with the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, :France, if
there is a claim that the authorities violated a
right protected by the European Convention on
Human Rights. In 1999 the European Court of
Human Rights 1·eceived more complaints from
Russian citizens than from any other country,
972 of the 8,396 cases lodged.

The admissibility of evidence
L'pun receipt of the ntse the I rial judgt~ reviews the accusa10ry pleading and, depending
on the sufficiency of the evidence, may set the
case for trial, return the case to the investigator
{hr further invcslig-at.ion, or dismiss all or some
of the charges. This pretrial hearing is often the
seuing for motions to suppress evidence due to
violations of the law committed by investigative
ollidals. The prohibition against the use of illegally seized evidence has been constitutionally
based since 1992 (Art. 50(2) Canst. RF) and was
codified as part of the 1993 Jury Law (Art.
69(para. 3) CCP). In jury cases there is a special
preliminary hearing before trial at which mo·
tions to suppress illegally seized evidence may be
made based on the documents in the investigative dossier '(Art. 433 (para. 3) CCP). Motions to
suppress evidence have been common in jury tri-
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als and are beginning to be made in nonjury trials. The Supreme Court has ruled, for instance,
that a statement made by a suspect without having been advised of 1he right 10 remain silcm or
without waiving the right to counsel must be excluded from the trial, a ruling quite similar to the
famous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
lWirmulr1 v. Ariuma. Cnun.~ have also routinely <'xduded evidence seized following unlawful
searches or other procedural violations. The
Russian exclusionary rule applies to evidence
gathered in violation of a statute, even if the violation was not of constitutional magnitude.
The exclusionary rule has not been effectively applied, especially in relation to alleged use of
torture or other coercion to compel confessions
by suspects. Allegations of the use of improper
methods are eommonly rejected by the trial
judge after at most a perfunctory investigation by
the proeuracy. The Supreme Court has also
ruled that a finding by the trial judge that a confession was voluntary will preclude the defendant or other witnesses from testifying before the
jury that the confession was the product of t&fture, threats, violence, promises, or other inducements and should not therefore be believed.

The criminal trial and the presumption of
innocence
In Russian criminal trials, the victim (poterproslliy) has rights equal to the defendant and
prosecutor to attend the trial, make a statement,
summon wil!u~sses, examine wilne.s~cs, argue at
the time of sentencing, and even prosecute the
case (injury u·ials) if he or she disagrees with the
procurator's motion to dismiss. As in other European eoumrks, the vie1im, or anyone ds<o suffering a loss as a result of the allegedly criminal acts
of the defendant, has the right to file a civil suit
for monetary damages or restitution that will be
IH:ard along with the rriminal caS<\ The civil
party may then join civil defendants other than
the accused to answer the claim, such as an insurance company or guardian of the accused.
Injury cases, the l.rialjudgc summons lwenty prospective jurors selected at random from the
jury lists to appear in court on the trial date. The
judge questions t.hejurors to make sure they are
qualified and the parties (including the victim)
may submit questions in writing to be posed by
the judge to determine whether the jurors are biased and thus subject. to challenge. The prosecution and defense each have two peremptory
challenges that may be used to exclude jurors
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without cause. The jury is composed, in the end,
of twelve jurors with two alternates.
After the reading of the accusatory pleading
the defendant. is then asked to enter a plea. If the
defendant pleads guilty, thi~ does not end the
case as it does in the United States. A guilty plea
is just considered to be a piece of evidence and
the procurat.or must present other evidence to
corroborate the guilty plea. In jury trials, however, upon an admission of guilt by the defendant, the court may then proceed t.o closing arguments if there is no dispute about the evidence
and the defense and prosecution agree. Legislation was proposed in 1998 to extend this procedure to normal trials hut it was defeated in the
State Duma. In t.he late 1990s much interest was
shown in introducing some kind of pleabargaining to reduce court caseloads.
After entry of a plea the defendant is given
an opportunity to make a statement. Before
doing so, the judge advises the defendant of the
constitutional right to remain silent. While defendants usually give their testimony at the beginning of the trial (this is common practice in
continental European countries), some judges in
jury cases have allowed the defendant to testify
later in the proceedings. After the defendant
makes a statement (they rarely remain silent), the
wit.nesses and experts testify. In standard inquisitorial fashion it is normally the judge who calls
the witnesses and asks them to narrate what they
know·ahout the fans that are the subject of the
criminal charge. This is quite dill'erent from t.he
question-and-answer format followed in direct
examination in common law trials. Only after the
judge finishes asking follow-up questions to the
witnesses, do the other parties have a chance to
formulate questions. In Russian mixed courts the
lay assessors may also ask questions of the defendant and witnesses, but rarely do. In jury courts,
thejurors may submit written questions to be li)rmulated by the presiding judge. "I11e new principle of adversary procedure has led, especially in
jury trials, to the judge taking a more passive role
and allowing liH~ parties to summon witnesses
and do the bulk of the questioning. The I 995
Draft CCP also provides for party control of the
summoning and questioning of witnesses.
During Soviet t.imes the presumption of innocence was considered to be "bourgeois nonsense" inconsistent with the inquisitorial nature
of .ScwiN criminal procedure. Although Article
49 of the Constitution now guarantees the presumption of innocence in criminal cases certain
old practices persist that seem to contradict such

a presumption. One is having the defendant
speak first. Another is the provision requiring
the trial judge to review the entire investigative
dossier bdim: trial to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to convict the defendant. In
nonjury cases this ensures that the judge, whether deciding the case alone or as the dominant.
lim:e in t.he mixed court, will be practically unable to give the defendant the benefit of a presumption of innocence when the trial begins. For
this reason halian judges are not permitted to
read the investigative dossier. The most problematic procedural rule, however, is the power of
the trial judge to return the case to the investigator t.o perform supplementary investigative act.s
after the trial has begun, in a jury case requiring
dissolution of the jury. In Soviet times this rule
enabled judges, in cases where there was insufficient evidence to convict, to avoid having to acquit the defendant and thereby impugn the
integrity of the investigative organs. On 20 April
I 999, the Constit.utional Court ruled that this
practice violates the constitutional presumption
of innocence and the right to adversary proEt::dure. The Constitutional Court indicated that
courts should acquit the defendant in such situations.
When all the evidence has been presented,
t.he parties give their dosing summations. The
last word in the trial is always personally that of
the defendant. In jury trials the judge also instructs the jury on the law that is to be applied in
the case and must summarize all the evidence
that supports both the prosecution and defense
theories of the case. It is reversible error for the
judge to in any way indicate his or her opinion
as to the guilt. or innocence of the defendant in
doing so.
In cases before the mixed court, the professional judge and the two lay assessors retire to
deliberate together, where they must collegially
decide all 'IUCSl.ions or law and L;u:l relating to
guilt and sentence. A majority vote is sufficient,
whereupon the professional judge formulates a
written judgment including the reasons for the
findings on guilt and sentenn:. Prior 1.0 deliberation in jury cases the judge formulates a list of
quest.ions that the jury must answer. The list
must minimally contain questions dealing with
whether the acts constituting the crime were
committed, whether the defendant was the person who committed them, and whether the defendant is guiit.y of their commission. Questions
are asked separately as to each defendant and
some judges formulate separate questions relat-
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ing to all relevant conduct charged against the
defendant as well as to all excuses or justifications
raised by the defense and all aggravating or miti!fitling r:u:tors. In one case over one thousand
questions were asked of the jury. Such "question
lists" were typical in continental European jury
systems during the nineteenth and early twentieth ccnluries and W(:re meant to give the professional judge the possibility of formulating a
reasoned judgment after a jury verdict.. Guilty
verdicts or answers unfavorable to the defendant
require seven votes; not guihy verdicts or answers favorable to the defendant require six votes
to be valid. After the jury reaches a verdirt, the
presiding judge evaluates the legal sufficiency of
the jury's answers to the questions and enters a
judgment of guilty or not guilty as to each
charge. The Supreme Court has ruled t.hat the
jury must only decide questions of fact and has
reversed many cases because the trial judge has
formulated questions that call for legal conclusions.
'Ibe shakiness of rhe presumption of innocence in Russian criminal trials is reflected by the
fact that acquittals are almost nonexistent. They
occurred in only 0.36 percem of all cases in I 998.
During the perestroika years the Soviet public was
shocked by many stories of innocent people having been convicted due to coerced or tortured
confessions and rhis was one reason why reforms
were pushed, among them, that of returning to
trial by jury. Indeed, juries have acquitted substantially more than nonjury courrs, anywhere
from 18-22 percent of the time. A disturbing development has been the refusal uf law enforcement organs to accept acquittals. For instance, in
November 1999 in Moscow, officers of the Federal Security Service, the sm:cessor of the KGB, entcn:d a com11'oom in canmullage unifi>nns and
black masks and re-arrested two defendants who
had been acquitted at trial by a military ('Ourt.
Such occurrences are not rare.

Review of judgments
The ddcndant, t.hc pmcurator, and the victim may appeal judgments at each level of the
court structure. The appellate court.s are empowered to review questions of fact as well as law. If
the accused appeals, the appellate court may not
find the defendant guilty of a more serious offense or impose a more severe punishment. The
procurator or the victim may appeal, however,
and seek to have the JUdgment overturned, and
a more severe punishment may be imposed upon
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retriaL Unlike in the Unired States the procurator or the victim may appeal an acquittal. (This
is also allowed in many continental European
cmmtries.)
The procuracr is quick to appeal nearly
every acquittal and the Supreme Court is just as
quick to reverse them. In 1997, for instance, the
Supreme Court reversed 33.1 percent or all acquittals and only 2.5 percent of guilty verdicts.
The Cassational Panel of the Supreme Court, responsible for hearing appeals ofjnry cases, overturned 66 percent of all jury acquittals in 1998.
In a few jury cases persons have been acquitted
two or three times, only to have their acquittals
reversed and new trials ordered by the Supreme
Court. Grounds for reversals of jury acquittals
have been faulty preparation of the question list,
defense testimony relating to unlawful methods
used by the police to ob£ain confessions, and erroneous exclusion of incriminating evidence
(i.e., a confession), tJms depriving the state of the
right to a fair triaL Although many of the acquittals were for atrocious murders, the Supreme
Court seems to be reversing acquittals as an obedient warrior in the battle against crime, not as
an impartial institution of the rule oflaw as it was
supposed to become as a result of the democratic
reforms.
The appellate courts may also reverse a
lower court judgment on grounds not pleaded
by the parties. Finally, fmal judgments may still
be subject to "review" (nad:wr). Pursuant ro this
procedure, higher courts may, on their own initiative or upon petition of the procurator (but
not the defense), review fimtljudgments oflower
courts, and court presidiums may review decisions of their own panels and overturn them if
they are not to their liking. This inquisitorial
mode or review has hecn critici1.cd as being in violation of the constitutional right to adversary
procedure and equality of the parties in the trial.
It is also a tool used by the higher courts to enf()rce conli1rmity in decision-making in the lower
courts and to discipline judges who seek to be independent in their resolution of cases. At least
one of the successor states of tl1e Soviet Union,
Geoq.,>ia. has ahnli,;hcd •his type of"revicw" in its
new Code of Criminal Procedure.

Substantive criminal law
TI1e de-sovietization of criminal law began
during the latter years of perestroika when the
Penal Code of 1960 was heavily amended to
eliminate offenses such as anti-Soviet agitation,
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defaming the Soviet State, and parasitism, alleged violations of which had sent hundreds of
thousands of Soviet citizens to the Gulag. But the
code was also obsolete, especially due to the profound economic changes triggered by the massive privatization of state property and the move
to a capitalist mark.et economy. The 1996 Criminal Code is divided imo a Gener.d P"drt. containing general principles relating to criminal
responsibility and assessment of punishment,
and a Special Part, listing the various offenses
and the punishments threatened for the commission thereof. Although Russians continue lO define crime, as in Soviet times, as a "socially
dangerous act," the "goals" ofthe code and the
interests it protects are no longer related to "the
socialist legal order" as was the case under the
old code. In most West.ern coumries neither a
substantive general definition of crime, nor a list
of protected interests is provided. A purely formal notion prevails, whereby any aCL punishable
in the criminal code is a crime. Tite new Russian
code incorporates universally recognized principles of criminal law such as that of no punishment without a written law, no retroactive laws,
and so on.
The general part. Persons arc subject In the
criminal law when they reach the age of sixteen
years for normal crimes, and fourt.een years for
murder and other grave crimes. Persons who are
insane at the time of commission of a crime may
not be convicted thereof. A person is insane
under the Russian Criminal Code if he or she
"could not understand the factual character and
social dangerousness of his acts (omissions) or
control them as a result of chronic psychic dismrball(:e. temporary psychic disturbance, imbecility
or any other sick. state of the psyche" (Art. 21
CC). "lnough Soviet criminal law did not recognize any form of diminished criminal responsibility for those who suffered from mental illness but
were not legally insane, this has been included in
the new code, but only as a mitigating factor in
sentencing. Due to the staggering rate of alcoholinduced violent criminality throughout. Russian
history, being int.oxicated has never been admissible to diminish criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment. While this remains true under
the new rode, being drunk. is no longer an aggra·
vating circumsr.ances in sent.encing as it was
under the old code.
The new Criminal Code int.roduces some
new factors that exclude guilt to go along with
traditional justifications such as self-defense or
necessity, or excuses such as duress. These in-

elude "innocent infliction of harm," by persons
who, due lO objective or subjective (mental) circumstances. could not have appreciated the dangerousness of their ans or have prevented the
harm (Art. 28 CC), or who inflict harm while tak.ing a socially useful justified risk (Art. 41 CC).
Other innovations are that first-time offenders
whn commit less serim1~ crimes can be {i·ecd of
criminal responsibility if they engage in "active
remorse" in the form of turning themselves in,
aiding in the solving of the crime, or making restitution (Art. 75 CC). Reconciliation with the victim (Art. 76 CC) or a change in conditions that
has caused either the offender or the crime to no
longer be socially dangerous (Art.. 77 CC} will
also lead to release from criminal responsibility.
Prosecutors have used these provisions to fashion bargains wi:lh offenders w work with the authorities in exchange for a dismissal, practices
that compensate for the lack of statutorily recognized plea bargaining and a relative lack. of prosecutorial discretion.
'lltc goal ofpunishmcm under iJu! n<:w code
is the re-establishment of social justice, the retfabilitation of the convicted person, and the prevention of the commission of new crimes (Art. 43
CC). "11u: widely uS<:d Soviet punishment nfbanishment was abolished toward the end of the perestroika period, but the 1996 Criminal Code still
includes the death penalty and other common
forms of punishment: fine, prohibition to engage
in a profession, confiscation of property, and deprivation of liberty among others. The death
penalty can only be imposed for especially grave
crimes against life and may not be imposed
against women, men under eighteen years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense, or
men over sixty years of age at the time of judgment (Art. 59 UK). Whereas fifteen years was the
maximum period ofimprisonment under the old
code, the 1996 code introduces life imJnisonment as an alternative to the death penalty, and
a maximum imprisonment of twenty years for
noncapital crimes and thirty years if a person is
sentenced for multiple crimes.
The death penalty. Ah.hnugh l•:mpress Elizabeth was one of the first monarchs to abolish the
death penalty in 17 53, the ban remained in force
only for a short time. Besides the extrajudicial
murders of millions by Soviet authorities during
its rule, death sentences were handed down by
Soviet courts often and not only as punishment.
for murder. Because the Soviet Union did not
publish criminal justice statistics it is difficult to
know how many people were judicially executed
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until the gumwst reforms instituted under Mikhail Gorbachev. Executions decreased during
the perestroika years from 770 in 1985 to 195 in
l!l!IIL II w-.1~ only in W!H thai lhc death penalty
was eliminated for economic crimes, such as theft
of socialist property, bribery, and illegal currency
transactions, and not untill994 that it was eliminalcd as a punishment lilr nmntcrfeiting. ·nw
number of executions during Yeltsin's presiden{:y fluctuated depending on presidential politics.
In 1992 the president established a Clemency
Commission that commuted 337 of the 378
death sentences submitted to it. Suddenly, however, Ydtsin proclaimed a tougher policy in d1e
fight against crime and only five of 129 death
sentences were commuted, and fifty-six persons
were executed in 1996 after Russia had declared
a moratorium on executions as a condition of its
entry into the Council of Europe. Russia was
strongly criticized by the Council of Europe and
no executions have apparemly taken place since
August of 1996. The Sixth Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights declares the
death penalty to be a violation of the right to life.
Between 1989 and 1992 most of the former
socialisl nmmries of nou-Soviel Europe abulished the death penalty. With respect to the successor states to the Soviet Union. Latvia declared
a moratorium on executions in 1996 and finally
eliminated the death penalty in 1!1!l!J. The Lithuanian Constitutional Court struck down the
death penalty in 1998 and eliminated it from its
Criminal Code in 1999. Bot.h countries, as well as
Esronia, which has dcdarcd a moratorium un tlu~
death penalty, are full members of the Coundl of
Europe. Uke Russia, t;kraine agreed to a mot·atorium on executions as a condition of entering
the Cnunril of Europe, but outraged that body by
secretly executing thirteen people in 1997. The
Ukrainian parliament finally eliminated the
death penalty in February of 2000. Membership
in the Cnundl of Europe has also pushed Moldavia (1995), Georgia (1997), and Azerbaijan
(1998) to abolish the death penalty and Armenia
to abide by an unofficial moratorium. Belarus,
which has still not been accepted inw the Counl'il
of Europe, executed thirty persons in 1997 and
still enforces dte death penalty. In Soviet Asia,
Kyrgystan declared a JUoratorium (December
1998), though courts continued to impose death
sentences as ofjanuary 2000. Turkmenistan executed around four hundred persons in 1996 and
sentenced seven hundred to death in 1997. mostly for drug-related crimes. In 1999, however, it
also declared an official moratorium. In 1996 Ka-
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zakhstan executed forty-two persons and made
a reduced number of offe11ses punishable by
death in its new Criminal Code, which went into
ellccl l January 1H9R. Dea1h sentenl'es continue
to be imposed and executed in Tadjikistan and
Uzbekistan as well, six having been executed in
d1e Iauer republic in January 2000. AU Soviet
Asian Slates wil.h lhc ex~:cptinn or Kyrgystan still
impose the death penalty for drug trafficking.
Even afler Russian executions stopped in
August 1996, trial courts continued to sentence
people to death in aggravated murder cases and
these sentences were often affirmed by the Supreme Court. On 2 February 1999, however, the
Constitutional Court declared that the death
penalty could no longer be imposed on equal
protection grounds. Inasmuch as Article 20 of
the Constituticih guarantees the right to trial by
jury for anyone facing the death penalty and the
jury system only functions in nine Russian regions and territories, the Court. held that no
death sentences could be imposed anywhere
until trial by jury was available throughoi/t
Russia.
The special part of the criminal code. The
Criminal Code contains a typical list of crimes
against the person (homicide, sexual offenses, assaub.ive conduct), but also includes an offense
punishing lhe 1.r.1nsmission or venereal diseases
orthe HIV virus (Arts. 121-122 UK). Chapter 19
of the Criminal Code punishes violations against
"the constitutional rights and freedoms of the
person and citizen," among them arts infringing
on the inviolability of one's private life, correspondence, and dwelling or on the liberty of confession or assembly, rights that went unprotected
in Soviet limes.
Among l.he most radical changes in llu: 19!lfi
Criminal Code are those contained in Section
Vlii relating to ''C1·imes in the Economic
Sphere." Under Soviet Law all types of private
enterprise were illegal and, al times, severely
punished. Theft of state property was considered
a more serious crime than theft of private property. Entrepreneurial activity is now protected by
tlw Constitution and regulated in the uiminal
law, with offenses punishing the hindering of
legal entrepreneurial activit.y, but also engaging
in illegal business dealings such as money laundering, restricting competition, false advertising,
securities or credit fraud. fraudulent bankruptcy, tax evasion, and <onsumer fraud. Drafters of
these provisions used dte American Model Penal
Code as a model. New provisions punish "ecological crimes" and "crimes in the sphere of com-
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puter information," including hacking and
creating viruses (Arts. 272, 273 CC). Russia has
suffered disastrous ecological consequences from
the near complete absence of laws regula! ing defense and heavy industry during Soviet times.
The new code punishes seventeen separate environmental crimes. some relating to general violat.ion of rules, o1.hcrs w improper handling of
dangerous substances such as biological agents
or toxins, still others protecting distinct resources such as water. the atmosphere, the sea,
the continemal shelf, the soil, the subsoil, and
flora and fauna (Arts. 248, 250-262 CC).
The new code punishes incitement to national, racial, or religious hatred (Art. 282 CC), an
important provision in a racially, ethnically, and
religiously diverse country with a history of conflict among the various groups. Chapter 30 punishes abuse of public office, bribery. and so on
(Arts. 285-293 UK). Despite the rampant corruption at all levels of Russian government there
have been no prosecutions during the Yeltsin
years of the ruling political elite connected with
the corrupt privatization of Soviet industry and
the granting of sweetheart export and customs
privileges. Nor have the provisions of Chapter 31
relating to "crimes against the administration of
justice" (Arts. 294-316 CC) been enforced, despite the open refusal of executive organs of the
administration ofjustice to abide by judicial decisions and the increase of violent attacks on
judges.
Finally, the 1996 Code has aimed to
strengthen the provisions designed to fight organized crime. "l11e general pari. of the code provides for aggravation of semences if a crime is
committed by a group of persons pursuant to a
<·onspiracy, by an organized group or uiminal
organization (Art. 3!1 CC). Chapu:r 24 punislu~s
individual "crimes against social security" such as
terrorism, taking hostages, organizing an illegal
armed group, and formation of a criminal organization. In I9!JH, 2X,t\33 crimes were omunit.t<:d
by organized groups or criminal organizations
(including 152 contract killings).

Sentencing and the prison system
On 1 july 1997, the "Criminal-Execution
Code of the Russian Federation" was passed. In
light of the notoriously brutal conditions in prison camps during Soviet times, the new Code explicitly lays out the rights and duties of prisoners.
With some exception, persons sentenced to imprisonment are required to serve their sentences

in correctional institutions within the territory of
the Russian Federation in which they lived or
were sentenced. Most. sentenced prisoners do
their time perl(>rming hard labor in "correctional colonies" with various levels of regimes depending on the severity of the crime committed.
In 1998 Russia imprisoned 700 persons per
WO,OUO population, lh<: second highest. raw in
the world after Rwanda, slightly higher than the
United States (668 per 100,000) and around fifteen times higher than in most European countries. As of I July 1997, the total prison
population in Russia was 1,017 ,848, of which
275,567 were in pretrial detention <:enters intended for a maximum of 182,358 detainees. To
alleviate the overcrowding of Russia's prisons the
State Duma adopted an amnesty law on 18 June
1999 t.o compel the release of around 100,000
detainees and prisoners. Tuberculosis caused the
death of 178 prisoners out of every 100,000 in
1995. 1n 1998 nearly 100,000 prisoners were diagnosed as being infected with the disease, I 0
percent ofthe total number ofinmates, and thirty thousand have an untreatable and deaifly
form thereof. Overall, 720 of every I 00,000 prisoners died in confinement in 1995, a great number thereof from tuberculosis, asphyxiation, and
suicide.

Crime in post-Soviet Russia
According to Soviet ideology, crime was a
"bourgeois" phenomenon, an excrescence of
capitalist society t.ha1 would disappear in a mature communist system. Crime statistics were not
published until Gorbachev's glasnost reforms so
one does not have a clear idea of the level of
nimc in Suvicl socicly. nut there is !iulc doubt
that crime has risen dramatically since the dismantling of the Soviet administrative-command
economy. Not only is corruption rampant at.
every kvd oflnc.tl and national govcrnmcnl, bnl
the new capitalist economy is widely controlled
either by organized crime or by so-called oligarchs who obtained large chunks of the former
slat.<: economy fiJr a rranion ofthdr value in exchange for sweetheart relationships with government officials at all levels. Russia's immense
wealth is being pillaged through t.he selling off of
former state assets and natural resources as well
as transfer-pricing and stock manipulations, and
the proceeds are being invested overseas instead
of in Russia. Organized criminal gangs, estimal.ed in the mid-1990s to number around three
thousand (in about fifty overarching syndicates),
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are active throughout Russia. The catastrophic
fall in gross national product, the inability to collect taxes, and two devastating and costly wars in
I he breakaway Republic nf Che1:hnya have !eli
the Russian government in a continuing fiscal
crisis. The number of registered crimes was 16.3
percent higher in 1999 than in 1998 and has
riS!:n every year since the early 19!:)0,;. Violent
crimes, and especially murders, have reached
shocking proportions. The number of intentional murders reported in 1999 was 31,140 (in a
population of around 147 million), compared
with "only" 16,910 in the Cnited States in 1998
(in a population of around 270 million). The government of Vladimir Putin, elected to succeed
Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation on 26 March 2000, must redirect the executive branch of government to fighting crime,
instead of participating in it, to su·engthening the
judicial branch of government, instead of sabotaging its enforcement of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial, and to
pushing to perfect the reforms, instead of obstructing them at every step of the way.
STEPHEN C. THAMAN
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COMPETENCY TO STAND
TRIAL
If at any time in the criminal proceedings the
defendant appears to be suffering from a mental
illness, the issue of competence to proceed may
he raised. 'l11is may ()(:cur when lhe dcknda01
seeks to plead guilty or to stand trial. It may
occur when the defendant seeks to waive certain
constitutional rights, such as the Fifth Amendment or Mimnda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (19fifi),
or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel or to a
jury trial. Even after conviction, the issue may he
raised at a sentencing hearing, or when the government seeks to administer punishment, including capital punishment. The issue usually is
raised by defense counsel by oral or written morion, but also may he raised by the prosecution or
by the court itself, even over the objection of the
defendant, who may prefer to proceed despite
the existence of mental illness.
Several studies conclude that. the vast majority of defendants are referred inappropriately for
competency evaluation and have suggested that
the competency process often is invoked for strategic purposes. The issue may be raised hy bo1h
sides to obtain delay, by prosecutors to avoid bail
or an expected insanity acquittal, or to bring
about hospitalization that might not otherwise
he available under l.he stal.C's dvil rornmitment
statute, or by defense attorneys to obtain mental health recommendations for use in making
an insanity defense, in ple-a bargaining, or in
scmenring.
Under Drope v. Missouri, 420 C.S. 162 ( 197 5 ),
and Pate 11. Robinson, 383 V .S. 37 5 (1966}, the
court must conduct an inquiry into competence
whenever a bona fide doubt is raised concerning
the issue. Even after the criminal trial has commenced, the court must order a competency
evaluation when reasonable grounds emerge to
question the defendant's competence. If this
does not occur even though a bona fide question

of competence exists, any resulting conviction
will violate due process.
When is such a bona fide doubt raised? Acrording 10 lJmpe 11. Mi.mmri, ''lcJvidenn: of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at
trial. and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whclhcr limJwr imtuiry is required, bul ...
even one of these factors standing alone may, in
some circumstances, be sutlicient." The Court
noted that there are "no fixed or immutable
signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry;" instead, "rhe question is often a
difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated" (p.
180). As a result of Drope and the rule of p,zte that
due process is violated if an incompetent defendant is subjectCild to trial, courts typically order a
formal competency evaluation in virtually every
case in which doubt about the issue is raised.
What happens when the court fails to order
a mmpetency determination when the evidence
raises a bona fide question concerning the issue?
When the defendant is subjected to trial in die
absence of such a determination, any ensuing
conviction would violate due process and must
he reversed under Pate 11. Robinson. Can a court
retrospeaively conduct the needed inquiry into
competence after the trial has occurred? Although Pate seemed to indicate that an automatic
reversal of such a convict.ion would he required,
lower courts have sometimes permitted such a
retrospective competency assessment when such
a determination is thought to he feasible in the
circumstances.

The competency standard and its
application
Mental illness alone, even a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, will not automatically result in a
finding ofinmmpelence. The l{llt~stion is the degree of functional impairment produced by such
illness. To be found incompetent, such mema[ illness must prevent the defendant from underslanding 1he nature of the pmce<:dings or from
assisting counsel in the making of the defense.
This standard focuses upon the defendant's
mental state at the time of triaL By contrast, the
legal insanity defense focuses upon the detendant's mental state at the time when the criminal
act occurred, and seeks to ascertain whether he
or she should he relieved of criminal responsibility as a result. The Supreme Court's classic formulation of the standard for incompetency in the

